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Abstract
In a series of papers Colbeck and Renner (2011, 2015a,b) claim to have shown that the quantum state
provides a complete description for the prediction of future measurement outcomes. In this paper I argue
that thus far no solid satisfactory proof has been presented to support this claim. Building on the earlier
work of Landsman (2015) and Leegwater (2016) I highlight the implicit use of an assumption concerning
the way unitary evolution is to be represented in any possible completion of quantum mechanics. I show
that the assumption is quite crucial to the proof of the claim and argue that it is unwarranted. I further
discuss a possible validation for a restricted version of this assumption that is based on considerations of
measurement processes. I argue that also this restricted version is unsatisfactory.
1 Introduction
Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? In the famous paper with this
title, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) argued that the question should be answered in the negative. It
was one of several arguments that Einstein devised and although it was presumably among his least favorites
(Fine, 2017), it is still the most widely known. Around the same time, von Neumann (1927, 1932) presented a
formal argument towards the opposite conclusion. Apart from starting from different assumptions1, the adopted
notions of completeness are also quite distinct (Elby, Brown, and Foster, 1993). While Einstein was concerned
with whether the quantum mechanical description sufficed to give a physical explanation of the phenomena
predicted, von Neumann adopted a more operational approach concerning the question whether the addition of
hidden variables could allow for deviating predictions for the phenomena. The following question was considered.
If we consider an ensemble of systems E described by a pure quantum state ψ, is it possible to decompose this
ensemble into sub-ensembles E1, E2, . . . such that the predictions for the sub-ensembles are not equal to the
predictions for the total ensemble? If not, then quantum mechanics may be considered complete.2
Colbeck and Renner’s completeness theorem (Colbeck and Renner, 2011, 2015a,b) alludes to von Neumann’s
notion of completeness. In their own words, they show that “[u]nder the assumption that measurements can
be chosen freely [...] no extension of quantum theory can give more information about the outcomes of future
measurements than quantum theory itself” (Colbeck and Renner, 2011, p. 1). The assumption of “free choice”
has since been identified as the conjunction of two more familiar assumptions: Parameter Independence and
Setting Independence3 (Ghirardi and Romano, 2013; Vona and Liang, 2014). Despite this clarification, there
has been confusion about whether these two assumptions suffice, or if more assumptions that rely on the specific
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics are needed. Landsman (2015) gave a critical assessment, arguing
that on top of these explicit assumptions, the proof of the ψ-completeness theorem relies on no less than four
further rather technical assumptions. A far more friendly conclusion was reached by Leegwater (2016) who gave
a thorough reworking of Colbeck and Renner’s original proof. However, Landsman’s worries were not explicitly
addressed by Leegwater, and the proof is not transparent enough to easily assess whether Landsman’s criticism
was indeed moot.
In this paper I argue that the general conclusion drawn by Colbeck and Renner is currently unwarranted.
First, a formal statement of their claim in terms of the ontic models framework is given in section 2. The general
strategy for proving the claim is to start with proving it for the special case of two systems in a maximally
entangled state. This case is discussed in section 3. In section 4 I discuss how this result is supposed to
generalize to the case of a single qubit. The crucial step needed to make that generalization is then scrutinized
and criticized in section 5.
1See (Dieks, 2017) for a comprehensive account of von Neumann’s proof.
2Actually, Von Neumann was specifically considering the possibility of dispersion-free sub-ensembles.
3Also known as Measurement Independence, λ-Independence, or No Conspiracy.
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Disclaimer
This is a shortened version of a paper that is currently in preparation. In the extended version I also discuss a
related ψ-ontology theorem by Colbeck and Renner and its relation to their completeness theorem. Although
that theorem has been given a rigorous formulation and proof by Leifer (2014), that proof does not trivially
extend to a proof of the completeness theorem. What is also missing in this version is an analysis of the
extension of Colbeck and Renner’s theorem for maximally entangled states, to measurements in the Schmidt-
basis for pairs of systems in non-maximally entangled states. This is the part of their proof that relies on the
notion of embezzlement.
2 Ontic models and ψ-completeness
Ontic models are a useful tool for studying non-classical features of quantum mechanics. They mimic the
structure of a “classical” theory by associating with every system a set Λ of possible ontic states for the system.
These ontic states determine how the system is to respond in the case of a measurement, in the sense that with
each possible measurement procedure the state λ associates a probability distribution over possible measurement
outcomes. When these probabilities are non-trivial, one may think of them encoding as dispositional properties
of the system. Possible preparations of the system are associated with probability distributions over the state
space (thus Λ is assumed to be a measurable space). These may be thought of as representing ignorance
concerning the actual state of the system.
The use of ontic models is not trivially innocuous. Colbeck and Renner themselves use a framework that is
more akin to the use of causal networks such as in the work of Wood and Spekkens (2015), so some notes are in
order. One reason for considering ontic models to not be general enough, is that they implicitly assume Setting
Independence: probability distributions over ontic states are taken to not depend on which measurements are
or are not performed on the system. Indeed, this is a common loophole in no-go theorems that may be exploited
in, for example, retrocausal approaches (Friederich and Evans, 2019). Although there are ways to generalize
the framework to try to accommodate for this loophole4, there is no need to go into this issue since Setting
Independence is accepted as part of the assumptions for the Colbeck Renner theorems.
A reason for preferring ontic models is that it is conceptually clearer. In a causal network approach, all
variables are treated on a par. Thus all the use of probability derives from a general probability distribution
on some space that is large enough to model all relevant variables as random variables. This means that
probability distributions not only specify the probabilities for states and measurement outcomes, but also for
which measurements are to be performed. The peculiarity of such a state of affairs has also been considered
troublesome by Seevinck and Uffink (2011, p. 438):
Even quantum mechanics leaves the question what measurement is going to be performed on a
system as one that is decided outside the theory, and does not specify how much more probable one
measurement is than another. It thus seems reasonable not to require from the candidate theories
that they describe such probabilities.
But perhaps more objectionable than demanding the well-definedness of probabilities for measurement settings,
is that such an approach invites ambiguity concerning the role of probability. In the ontic models there is a
separate role for both epistemic and ontological probabilities, but these get intertwined in a causal network
approach when the measurement choices correspond to nodes in the network.
The prime constraint for ontic models, is that they can reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions for
measurements on any quantum system. Here, with a quantum system we associate a finite-dimensional Hilbert
space H. For the set of possible measurements M we assume that any M ∈ M can be represented by a
self-adjoint operator A, i.e., we only consider PVMs. For the set of possible preparations P we assume that
any P ∈ P can be represented by a density operator ρ. If ρ is pure, we will often used a unit vector ψ to
represent the state that satisfies ρ = [ψ] where [ψ] denotes the 1-dimensional projection on the line spanned by
ψ. For the set of possible preparations T we assume that any T ∈ T can be represented by a unitary operator
U . We allow for contextuality, i.e, the mappings M 7→ A, P 7→ ρ, T 7→ U will in general be many-to-one. The
probabilities for measurement outcomes are given by the Born rule. That is, when P, T,M are represented by
ρ, U,A respectively, then
P(a|M,T, P ) = Tr (UρU∗PAa ) , (1)
where PAa is the projection onto the eigenspace of A corresponding to the eigenvalue a.
4See for example (Hermens, 2019).
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An ontic model for a quantum system consists of a measurable space of ontic states (ΛH,ΣH), where ΛH is
the set of ontic states and ΣH is a σ-algebra of subsets of ΛH. Every measurement M ∈M, is associated with
a Markov kernel pM , called a response function, that associates with every λ ∈ ΛH a probability distribution
pM ( . |λ) over the possible measurement outcomes. Following Leegwater (2016), these probabilities will be called
λ-probabilities. Every preparation P ∈ P is associated with a probability measure µP over the ontic states
and every transformation T ∈ T is associated with a Markov kernel γT from ΛH to itself. On average, the
predictions of quantum mechanics are required to be reproduced:
P(a|M,P ) =
∫
pM (a|λ) dµP (λ),
P(a|M,T, P ) =
∫∫
pM (a|λ)γT ( dλ|λ′) dµP (λ′).
(2)
Often, when there is no cause for confusion, the use of P, T,M will be replaced by their quantum mechanical
representatives, resulting in more transparent equations like∫∫
pA(a|λ)γU ( dλ|λ′) dµψ(λ′) =
〈
Uψ
∣∣PAa ∣∣Uψ〉 . (3)
In other cases, the quantum representatives will be added as subscripts. So MA denotes a measurement proce-
dure represented by the self-adjoint operator A in quantum mechanics.
It is worth noting that transformations can be reconsidered to be part of either the preparation procedure
or the measurement procedure. Specifically, for any MA, TU we can introduce the response function pMA◦TU by
pMA◦TU (a|λ) :=
∫
pMA(a|λ′)γTU ( dλ′|λ), (4)
which corresponds to an operational procedure for a measurement that is represented quantum mechanically
by the operator U∗AU . Likewise, for any TU , Pρ we can introduce the probability distribution µTU◦Pρ by
µTU◦Pρ(∆) =
∫
γTU (∆|λ) dµPρ(λ), ∆ ∈ ΣH, (5)
which corresponds to an operational procedure for a preparation of the state represented by UρU∗. Finally, any
two transformations γT1 , γT2 may be stringed together to give the transformation “T2 after T1” given by
(γT2 ◦ γT1) (∆|λ) =
∫
γT2(∆|λ′)γT1( dλ′|λ). (6)
A straightforward ontic model for quantum mechanics is the one by Beltrametti and Bugajski (1995), which
is basically quantum mechanics itself. The set of ontic states ΛH is taken to be the set of pure quantum states.
The λ-probabilities for a measurement MA are given by the Born rule, i.e., for each [ψ] ∈ ΛH
pMA(a|[ψ]) =
〈
ψ
∣∣PAa ∣∣ψ〉 (7)
A preparation Pψ of a pure state corresponds to the Dirac-distribution centered on [ψ], while a preparation of a
mixed state corresponds to an appropriate convex combination of such Dirac-distributions. So in general there
are multiple distinct distributions µρ corresponding to the same ρ. The quantum dynamics are just copied, i.e,
γU (∆|[ψ]) =
{
1 [Uψ] ∈ ∆,
0 otherwise.
(8)
This model may rightfully be said to be trivial. In particular because it has the property that the λ-
probabilities coincide with the quantum probabilities. This is the key idea to the formal notion of triviality.
Definition 1. An ontic model for a quantum system is said to be trivial w.r.t. a set of measurementsM′ ⊂M
and preparations P ′ ⊂ P if for every preparation Pρ ∈ P ′ and every measurement MA ∈M′ the λ-probabilities
µP -almost surely coincide with the quantum mechanical probabilities:∫ ∣∣pMA(a|λ)− Tr (ρPAa )∣∣ dµPρ(λ) = 0 (9)
or, equivalently,
µPρ
({
λ ∈ ΛH
∣∣ pMA(a|λ) = Tr (ρPAa )}) = 1. (10)
Colbeck and Renner’s completeness theorem may now be formulated as follows:
Claim 1. For any quantum system where M covers all PVMs and P is arbitrary, every ontic model that
satisfies Parameter Independence must be trivial w.r.t. M and P.
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3 A partial proof for Claim 1
The simplest partial proof for Claim 1 concerns local measurements on a qubit pair in a maximally entangled
state. The question is then of course how to generalize this to arbitrary states, arbitrary measurements and
to higher dimensional Hilbert spaces. Here, I shall only be concerned with a specific step in the generalization
process, leaving discussion of the other steps for an extended version of the paper. But first an unambiguous
formulation of the partial claim is required.
The scenario is the familiar EPRB setup with associated Hilbert space H2 = C2 ⊗C2, and a preparation of
the two qubits in the state
ψ2 =
1
2
√
2 (e1 ⊗ e1 + e2 ⊗ e2) , (11)
where e1, e2 is an arbitrary orthonormal basis for C2. One of the qubits is then send to Alice, and the other to
Bob, who are assumed to be space-like separated.
Let M be a set of possible measurements that covers all PVMs. Let MA denote the subset of possible
measurements where only Alice performs a measurement (locally). These can be represented by self-adjoint
operators of the form A ⊗ 1. Symmetrically, let B to be the possible measurements where only Bob performs
a measurements, which can thus be represented by operators of the form 1 ⊗ B. Finally, take MLOC to
be the set of measurements where either Alice or Bob performs a measurement or both. So one may take
MLOC 'MA ×MB . Parameter Independence can now be formulated as
pMA⊗1(a|λ) =
∑
b
pMA⊗B (a, b|λ),
pM1⊗B (b|λ) =
∑
a
pMA⊗B (a, b|λ),
(12)
for all MA⊗1 ∈ MA,M1⊗B ∈ MB ,MA⊗B ∈ MLOC. Here the local operational procedures MA⊗1 and M1⊗B
should be the same as those represented by MA⊗B . We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Any ontic model for the qubit pair where M covers all local measurements and P covers the state
ψ2 that satisfies Parameter Independence must be trivial w.r.t. MLOC and ψ2.
A proof for this theorem can be found in the proof of Theorem 10.4 in (Leifer, 2014). A few remarks
concerning possible generalizations are useful. First, it is relatively straightforward to generalize the theorem
to cover local measurements on a pair of n-level systems in a maximally entangled state (see (ibid., Theorem
10.7)). Although this is still far removed from a proof of Claim 1, it deserves to be noted that the result is
an improvement on earlier work. Stairs (1983) showed that for a qutrit pair in a maximally entangled state
there is no value definite ontic model that satisfies Parameter Independence.5 The work by Colbeck and Renner
improves on this result on two accounts: the result also holds for qubits, and not only must ontic models be
probabilistic, they must even follow the quantum probability rule. But like the proof of Stairs’ theorem, the
proof of Theorem 1 relies on the correlations between space-like separated measurements being perfect. It is
then perhaps not too surprising that the next generalization of the theorem for arbitrary entangled states only
works for local measurements whose corresponding self-adjoint operator is diagonal in some Schmidt basis. The
final step to generalize to arbitrary measurements goes hand in hand with the generalization to measurements
on a single system that is not entangled. However, for specific measurements on a single qubit the the final step
can directly be applied and there is no need to go into the technical notion of embezzlement. This is follows
the approach by Landsman (2015). In the next section I will explain how this step is supposed to work.
4 Claim 1 for a Single Qubit
The idea of a completeness proof for single quantum system seems peculiar given that non-trivial ontic models
for arbitrary n-level quantum systems have been around since the work of Bell (1966) and Gudder (1970).
Trivially, these models may be assumed to satisfy Parameter Independence since there is no second system
in play with which it could interact. But this lack of a description of interaction is also just a deficiency of
these models. In principle, one can imagine that under certain minimal assumptions on interactions, Parameter
Independence becomes applicable and ontic models necessarily have to become trivial. This seems at least to
be the aim of Colbeck and Renner, and so it is useful to look if their strategy works for the simplest possible
case: a single qubit.
5In the present formulation, value definiteness can be understood as the assumption that the λ-probabilities are 0,1-valued.
Stair’s theorem is now perhaps more widely known as the Free Will Theorem by Conway and Kochen (2006, 2009).
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The Hilbert space for a single qubit is H1 = C2. Consider a preparation of the system corresponding to the
pure state
ψ1 =
1
2
√
2(e1 + e2), (13)
for some orthonormal basis {e1, e2}. The focus is on a possible measurement represented by the self-adjoint
operator A = a1[e1] + a2[e2] (a1 6= a2). It is straightforward to devise an ontic model for the qubit that is
non-trivial with respect to this measurement for this state. That is, a model in which∫ ∣∣pA(ai|λ)− 12 ∣∣ dµψ1(λ) 6= 0. (14)
This is in striking contrast to the consequence of Theorem 1 that says that for any ontic model for the qubit
pair we have ∫ ∣∣pA⊗1(ai|λ)− 12 ∣∣ dµψ2(λ) = 0. (15)
Could it be possible to argue from this that any ontic model for the single qubit in which (14) is the case should
be rejected?
The step needed to make the connection is most explicit in the work of (Leegwater, 2016, §8). Instead of
looking at A⊗ 1 the focus is on 1⊗B where B = b1[e1] + b2[e2]. By Theorem 1 the relevant analogue of (15)
also holds for measurements represented by this operator. The step is then that since “by definition”6
P(ai|A,ψ1) = P(bi|1⊗B,ψ2) (16)
“the same relation holds when considering λ-probabilities:”
pψ1A (ai|, λ) = pψ21⊗B(bi|λ). (17)
Presumably, (17) is supposed to imply that (14) cannot hold in any ontic model for a qubit that also allows
the qubit to be coupled to another qubit in such a way that all the relevant predictions of quantum mechanics
can be reproduced and such that the ontic model satisfies Parameter Independence. Whether such is the case
of course depends on what (17) exactly expresses. This is not entirely trivial as a formal definition of the
expression is lacking. As a first step in fleshing out what it expresses let us assume that the inference from (16)
to (17) is valid if and only if the inference from
P(ai|A,ψ1) = P(ai|A⊗ 1, ψ2) (18)
to
pψ1A (ai|λ) = pψ2A⊗1(ai|λ) (19)
is valid. This is reasonable since if one inference holds, then, by Theorem 1, the other holds as well.
In quantum mechanics (18) holds as a consequence of the mathematical structure of the theory and how it
deals with composing joint systems out of individual systems. But it is important to note that the equation
expresses a numerical equivalence of two probabilities that are defined in separate models. The objects A and
ψ1 strictly belong to the single qubit model while A ⊗ 1 and ψ2 belong to the qubit pair model. The fact
that the same symbol P is used on both sides of the equation does not mean that the equation establishes the
equality of two values a single function takes on for two distinct arguments; the two functions are distinct. But
no such relation is a priori available to link ontic models of bipartite systems to ontic models for their parts,
and so it is not clear how one can have an equality between objects from distinct models. A second problem is
that the objects on both side of (19) also are not well-defined. As these problems are intertwined I will deal
with them simultaneously.
A part of the problem stems from trying to analyze (19) in the language of ontic models, while Colbeck,
Renner and Leegwater take a different approach. On their approach, both ψ1 and λ are possible values for
random variables, as is the measurement setting and the measurement outcome. Then pψ1A (ai|λ) expresses
the probability of obtaining the outcome ai given that the quantum state is ψ1 and the measurement is A
and something else, dubbed λ. It may be possible that they intend the random variable that determines the
quantum state to not just range over states for a specific Hilbert space, but also across different Hilbert spaces.
Then both ψ1 and ψ2 are possible values and so there is a well-defined probability that the system will be a
single qubit and a well-defined probability that it will be a qubit pair, determined by the single function P. But
this idea will be avoided here.
6The notation of the equations has been adjusted to fit the notation in this paper.
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Another important distinction is that Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater do not presuppose that λ provides
all relevant information concerning the system and so “adding” ψ to λ may give more information about the
possible outcomes. This explains the occurrence of quantum states in (19). Informally speaking, the quantum
state may also be taken to give relevant information within the use of an ontic model. As it specifies the
preparation of the system, it may indicate what behavior of λ may be considered to be “typical”. So the
notation in (19) may be interpreted as providing a convenient way of specifying a constraint on the possible
λ’s. A way to make this precise, is to assume (like Landsman (2015)) that equations adopting quantum states
express equation that hold µψ1-almost surely, i.e.,
pψ1A (ai|λ) = f(λ) ⇐⇒
∫
|pA(ai|λ)− f(λ)| dµψ1(λ) = 0. (20)
This helps in clarifying how to interpret both sides of (19). It does not help yet in interpreting what equality
between the two means. A problem with (19) is that it refers to two distinct quantum states (never mind that
they also belong to distinct Hilbert spaces). Landsman (ibid.) doubles down on the almost surely interpretation
here and proposes the definition
pψ1A (ai|λ) = pψ2A⊗1(ai|λ)
⇐⇒
∀f : pψ1A (ai|λ) = f(λ) iff pψ2A⊗1(ai|λ) = f(λ).
(21)
A first problem here is that, given any pair of ontic models for the two considered systems, it is to be expected
that the λ’s on both sides of the equation of (19) do not refer to the same thing. But even when that issue is
resolved, (21) is an unreasonably strong assumption, as it implies that if (19) holds, then pA(ai|λ) = pA⊗1(ai|λ)
both µψ1-almost surely and µψ2-almost surely. Moreover, distributions for µψ1 and µψ2 completely overlap on
the region of Λ where pA(ai|λ) is non-zero.7 A solution to the problem can be found in the work of Leegwater
(2016), and it overlaps with the solution to the double use of λ for physically distinct systems. In the discussion
of some of the notation used similar to that occurring in (19), Leegwater notes
here λ still refers to the variable assigned to system A when it was in the state |ψ〉A [. . . ] λ always
refers to the original system A, and there is only one measure µ(λ) that is considered. [p.21]
The measure µ refers to a probability distribution over Λ that may depend on |ψ〉A as well as other factors.
Given that there is only one measure considered, which is related to a particular quantum state, all other
quantum states should be understood as being arrived at after interactions with a system prepared according
to |ψ〉A.
Translating this to the present discussion, we find that pψ2A⊗1(ai|λ) refers to a single qubit that is prepared
in the quantum state ψ1 and having ontic state λ, then is being coupled to a second qubit with unknown state
and then a unitary transformation is performed on the joint system such that the resulting quantum state is ψ2.
To deal with the coupling, one needs a rule to relate an ontic model for a single system to that of a combined
system. One way to do this, is to adopt the Preparation Independence assumption from the PBR-theorem. I
will however follow a more economic approach based on (Leifer, 2014, §8.2): appending an ancilla is modeled
by a Markov kernel from the ontic state space of the single system ΛH1 to the ontic state space of the combined
system ΛH2 .
For sake of definiteness, let us assume that the second qubit was prepared according to the quantum state
φ. Appending this system to the first qubit is then modeled by a Markov kernel γφ in such a way that the
resulting measure on ΛH2 given by
∫
ΛH1
γφ( . |λ) dµψ1(λ) models a preparation of the state ψ1 ⊗ φ for the joint
system. Now let U be a unitary operator that takes ψ1 ⊗ φ to ψ2 and let γU be a Markov kernel on ΛH2 that
models it. We can now give a proper reformulation of (19):
pA(ai|λ) =
∫∫
pA⊗1(ai|λ′′)γU ( dλ′′|λ′)γφ( dλ′|λ) (22)
µψ1-almost surely. In the next section I argue that the validity of this equality is non-trivial and should be
distrusted.
7This may be seen as follows. The first claim follows from evaluating (21) for the choice f(λ) = pA(ai|λ). The second claim
follows with a proof from contradiction. If there exists a ∆ ⊂ Λ such that µψ2 (∆) > 0 = µψ1 (∆) and on which pA⊗1(ai|λ) is
non-zero, then for any f such that pψ1A (ai|λ) = f(λ) and pψ2A⊗1(ai|λ) = f(λ) one can define an f ′ that differs from f only on ∆ in
such a way that pψ2A⊗1(ai|λ) = f ′(λ) no longer holds. So (19) would fail.
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5 Unitary Processes and Measurements
It is not obvious from the work from Colbeck, Renner and Leegwater what should be taken to be the main
argument for the inference from (18) to (22). To get a handle on what it takes for (22) to hold, I show that it
can be derived with the help of two assumptions:
• Ancilla Independence. λ-probabilities for single systems arise as averages of λ-probabilities for local
measurements on a joint system:
pMA(a|λ) =
∫
pMA⊗1(a|λ′)γφ( dλ′|λ), (23)
where pMA and pMA⊗1 are taken to represent the same operational procedure of a measurement performed
on the first system.
• Unitary Faithfulness. Probabilities that are invariant under a unitary operation in quantum mechanics
are also invariant at the ontic level:
Tr
(
ρPAa
)
= Tr
(
UρU∗PAa
)
=⇒ pMA(a|λ) =
∫
pMA(a|λ′)γTU ( dλ′|λ) µPρ -a.s.. (24)
With these assumptions (22) can indeed be derived:∫
ΛH1
∣∣∣∣∣pA(ai|λ)−
∫∫
ΛH2
pA⊗1(ai|λ′′)γU ( dλ′′|λ′)γφ( dλ′|λ)
∣∣∣∣∣ dµψ1(λ)
=
∫
ΛH1
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
ΛH2
pA⊗1(ai|λ′)γφ( dλ′|λ)−
∫∫
ΛH2
pA⊗1(ai|λ′′)γU ( dλ′′|λ′)γφ( dλ′|λ)
∣∣∣∣∣ dµψ1(λ)
≤
∫
ΛH1
∫
ΛH2
∣∣∣∣∣pA⊗1(ai|λ′)−
∫
ΛH2
pA⊗1(ai|λ′′)γU ( dλ′′|λ′)
∣∣∣∣∣ γφ( dλ′|λ) dµψ1(λ)
=
∫
ΛH2
∣∣∣∣∣pA⊗1(ai|λ′)−
∫
ΛH2
pA⊗1(ai|λ′′)γU ( dλ′′|λ′)
∣∣∣∣∣ dµψ1⊗φ(λ) = 0.
(25)
A possible motivation for Ancilla Independence is the idea that the act of “appending an ancilla” does not
itself disturb the initial system but merely concerns a re-description of the initial system. On this reading Ancilla
Independence is the criterion that a model for a joint system should be at least as expressive as a model for any
of its components. I do not have a tentative motivation for Unitary Faithfulness. This is problematic, as it has
immediate consequences that are quite crucial when it comes to proving completeness. Note that completeness
boils down to the idea that response functions are dispersion free under preparations of pure quantum states.
Now suppose
〈
ψ
∣∣PAa ∣∣ψ〉 = 〈Uψ∣∣PAa ∣∣Uψ〉, Unitary Faithfulness then has the following consequence for the
dispersion of any corresponding response function:
Varψ(pA(a| . )) =
∫
pA(a|λ)2 dµψ(λ)−
(∫
pA(a|λ) dµψ(λ)
)2
=
∫ (∫
pA(a|λ′)γU ( dλ′|λ)
)2
dµψ(λ)−
(∫∫
pA(a|λ′)γU (λ′|λ) dµψ(λ)
)2
≤
∫∫
pA(a|λ′)2γU ( dλ′|λ) dµψ(λ)−
(∫∫
pA(a|λ′)γU (λ′|λ) dµψ(λ)
)2
= VarUψ(pA(a| . ))
(26)
It follows that if one can show that for some quantum state Uψ the response function is dispersion free for a
particular measurement, then the response function must also be dispersion free for any other quantum state
ψ whenever the operational probabilities for the measurement are equal. Since this gets at the heart of what
the Colbeck-Renner theorem states, this implicit assumption should have at least been explicitly stated and
preferably be well-motivated. Neither appears to be the case though.
A possible explanation is that perhaps the inference from (18) to (22) is not assumed to hold in general, but
only under circumstances that make it more plausible. An appeal to measurement procedures could perhaps
do the trick. According to quantum theory, instead of directly measuring A on the qubit in the state ψ1, one
may equivalently first entangle it with a second system to obtain the joint state ψ2 and measure instead B on
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the second system. If we assume this to be a legitimate procedure generally also for the ontic model, we are
just assuming Unitary Faithfulness. But we may instead focus on the case where system B is a measurement
device designed to measure A on the qubit. This is indeed the scenario within which the crucial inference is
considered in (Colbeck and Renner, 2011, p.4-5) and (Leegwater, 2016, §8).
Arguably, an appeal to what actually happens in a measurement process is not a very elegant strategy in
a theory that is infamous for its measurement problem. The transition from ψ1 to ψ2 is of course well-known
as part of the von Neumann measurement scheme. Although that scheme is idealized, that will not concern us
here. Indeed, Colbeck and Renner also consider situations with interaction with the environment.
The well-known problem is that the state ψ2, on its own, does not signify a situation in which a measurement
outcome is obtained. Ontic models are usually not designed to resolve this problem. The Beltrametti-Bugajski
model illustrates this nicely. More generally, given any ontic model for a single qubit, a peculiarity is that
probabilities for outcomes of measurements are well-defined without any mentioning of how the qubit would
interact with a measurement apparatus. Ideally, the λ-probability pM (a|λ) encodes the probability with which
the system, upon interaction with an appropriate measurement apparatus, would evolve towards a joint state in
which the measurement apparatus can be taken to be in a well-defined pointer state displaying the outcome of
the measurement. Explicitly, if ∆Ma ⊂ ΛH2 denotes the set of states of the joint system in which the apparatus
displays the outcome a, then we may assume
pM (a|λ) = γM
(
∆Ma
∣∣λ) , (27)
where γM is a Markov kernel that models the interaction with the measurement apparatus.
The question is now how this measurement process γM relates to the von Neumann-type process described
by γU ◦ γφ. In a spontaneous collapse theory, the macroscopic superposition ψ2 is extremely unlikely to obtain
and γM contains a collapse way before the unitary evolution U is completed. Consequently, an appeal to
measurements is irrelevant for the question whether Claim 1 applies to such theories and a general assumption
like Unitary Faithfulness is required.
To be fair, in the first paper Colbeck and Renner (2011) did assume that “all processes within quantum
theory can be considered as unitary evolutions”. Although this explicit statement is dropped in any of the
following papers, perhaps their result should be taken to apply only to no-collapse ontic models. In this case
we may have that γM = γU ◦ γφ. A solution to the measurement problem in the form of satisfying (27) is then
only possible if the ontic model is non-trivial.8 Bohmian mechanics is the most familiar theory in this style.
But although it violates Parameter Independence, it may serve as a source of inspiration if the logic behind
measurement-based argument for Claim 1 can be closed.
It is worthwhile to quickly recap what the argument now has become. The procedure to measure A on a
qubit, involves hooking it up to a measurement device, evolving the joint system to ψ2 and then reading of the
value of B from the device. Reading of this value constitutes a measurement of B on the measurement device.
Because in a no-collapse theory this is roughly what it means to measure A on a qubit, the outcome statistics
for B on the joint system should equal the outcome statistics for A on the singe qubit. But, if in addition the
criteria for Theorem 1 are in place, then the outcome statistics for B should be equal to the quantum statistics
and so also the statistics for A should equal the quantum statistics.
Applicability of Theorem 1 requires Parameter Independence. Thus we need to assume that it is possible
to postpone the B-measurement until qubit and apparatus are again spatially separated. Moreover, at this
stage it should also be possible to refrain from performing a B-measurement, and instead perform any other
measurement and, in addition, to perform any other measurement on the qubit as well. If not, the chained
Bell-inequalities upon which the proof of Theorem 1 rests cannot come of the ground.
This scenario seems quite unlikely when one thinks about how spin measurements work in Bohmian mechan-
ics (Norsen, 2014). In the Stern-Gerlach setup, the spin degree of freedom becomes encoded in the trajectory
of the silver atom. A position measurement then yields the outcome of the spin measurement. But there is
of course no sense in which at that point one can still also measure the spin in another direction whilst not
affecting the particle position. Perhaps then the right system to figure as apparatus is the screen. While the
particles of the screen become entangled with the silver atom, it is hard to imagine how they may be separated
again from the silver atom in such a way that still different spin measurements can be performed on the atom,
as well as different measurements on the screen. One may complaint that in principle the separation of the two
systems once in the state ψ2 should be possible and that in principle the required measurements are possible.
But I do not see how that argument would amount to anything more substantial than the idea that in principle
Unitary Faithfulness should just be true.
8Arguably, taking an Everett-type approach to solving the measurement problem takes one out of the frameworks of ontic models
and causal networks, as these frameworks in a way presuppose a single world universe.
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What lies at the heart of the problem here, is that in Bohmian mechanics, particles do not have spin
properties in any classical sense. Necessarily so, given the Kochen-Specker theorem. Instead, spin properties
correspond to dispositional properties and the physical quantities are only meaningful in the context of an
experimental setup that can be used to reveal them (Goldstein, 2017, §10). This is also the way to think
about response functions in ontic models: they encode dispositional properties that can come to the for in a
measurement scenario. But once brought about, it is not per se meaningful to say that dispositional properties
before measurement encoded by other response functions are still there. This idea is of course very Bohrian in
spirit. In fact, Bohr’s response to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, when taken out of context, seems strangely
apt to qualify the issue regarding the stage when ψ2 obtains, if one changes just one word:
But even at this stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions which
define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system. Since these
conditions constitute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which the term
“physical reality” can properly be attached, we see that the argumentation of the mentioned authors
does not justify their conclusion that the quantum-mechanical description is essentially [complete].
(Bohr, 1935, p.700)
References
Bell, J. S. (1966). “On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics”. Review of Modern Physics
38 (3), pp. 447–452.
Beltrametti, E. G. and S. Bugajski (1995). “A classical extension of quantum mechanics”. Journal of Physics
A: Mathematical and General 28 (12), pp. 3329–3343.
Bohr, N. (1935). “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” Physical
Review 48 (8), pp. 696–702.
Colbeck, R. and R. Renner (2011). “No extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power”.
Nature communications 2, p. 411. arXiv: 1005.5173 [quant-ph].
— (2015a). “On the Sufficiency of the Wavefunction”. The Message of Quantum Science. Ed. by P. Blanchard
and J. Fro¨hlich. Berlin: Springer.
— (2015b). “The Completeness of Quantum Theory for Predicting Measurement Outcomes”. Quantum Theory:
Informational Foundations and Foils. Ed. by G. Chiribella and R. W. Spekkens. Dordrecht: Springer. arXiv:
1208.4123 [quant-ph].
Conway, J. and S. Kochen (2006). “The Free Will Theorem”. Foundations of Physics 36 (10), pp. 1441–1473.
arXiv: quant-ph/0604079.
— (2009). “The Strong Free Will Theorem”. Notices of the AMS 56 (2), pp. 226–232. arXiv: arXiv:0807.3286.
Dieks, D. (2017). “Von Neumann’s impossibility proof: Mathematics in the service of rhetorics”. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 60, pp. 136–148. arXiv: 1801.09305 [physics.hist-ph].
Einstein, A., B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (1935). “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be
Considered Complete?” Physical Review 47 (10), pp. 777–780.
Elby, A., H. R. Brown, and S. Foster (1993). “What Makes a Theory Physically “Complete”?” Foundations of
Physics 23 (7).
Fine, A. (2017). “The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument in Quantum Theory”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Ed. by E. N. Zalta. url: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/qt-
epr/.
Friederich, S. and P. W. Evans (2019). “Retrocausality in Quantum Mechanics”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Ed. by E. N. Zalta. url: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/qm-
retrocausality/.
Ghirardi, G. and R. Romano (2013). “About Possible Extensions of Quantum Theory”. Foundations of Physics
43, pp. 881–894. arXiv: 1301.5040 [quant-ph].
Goldstein, S. (2017). “Bohmian Mechanics”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by E. N. Zalta. url:
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/qm-bohm/.
Gudder, S. P. (1970). “On hidden variable theories”. Journal of Mathematical Physics 11, pp. 431–436.
Hermens, R. (2019). “An Operationalist Perspective on Setting Dependence”. Foundations of Physics 49.3,
pp. 260–282.
Landsman, K. (2015). “On the Colbeck-Renner theorem”. Journal of Mathematical Physics 56, p. 122103.
Leegwater, G. (2016). “An impossibility theorem for parameter independent hidden variable theories”. Studies
in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 54, pp. 18–34. arXiv: 1705.08341 [quant-ph].
9
Thursday 4th July, 2019 14:47
R. Hermens, Completely Real?
A Critical Note on the Theorems by Colbeck and Renner
Leifer, M. S. (2014). “Is the quantum state real? An extended review of ψ-ontology theorems”. Quanta 3.1,
pp. 67–155.
Neumann, J. von (1927). “Wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretischer Aufbau der Quantenmechanik”. Nachrichten von
der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go¨ttingen, Mathematisch-Physikalische Klasse, pp. 245–272.
— (1932). Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik. Berlin: Springer.
Norsen, T. (2014). “The pilot-wave perspective on spin”. American Journal of Physics 82, pp. 337–348. arXiv:
1305.1280 [quant-ph].
Seevinck, M. P. and J. Uffink (2011). “Not Throwing out the Baby with the Bathwater: Bell’s Condition of
Local Causality Mathematically ‘Sharp and Clean’”. Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation. Ed. by D.
Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel, and M. Weber. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 425–450.
Stairs, A. (1983). “Quantum Logic, Realism, and Value Definiteness”. Philosophy of Science 50 (4), pp. 578–602.
Vona, N. and Y.-C. Liang (2014). “Bell’s theorem, accountability and nonlocality”. Journal of Physics A:
Mathematical and Theoretical 47.42, p. 424026. arXiv: 1307.4365 [quant-ph].
Wood, C. J. and R. W. Spekkens (2015). “The lesson of causal discovery algorithms for quantum correlations:
causal explanations of Bell-inequality violations require fine-tuning”. New Journal of Physics 17, p. 033002.
arXiv: 1208.4119 [quant-ph].
10
